Really Leaving No Child behind: How the Supreme Court\u27s Student Speech Doctrine Compromises Modern Education Reform - And How It Can Use the In Loco Parentis Doctrine to Change It by Street, Scott J.
REALLY LEAVING NO CHILD BEHIND:
HOW THE SUPREME COURT'S STUDENT SPEECH
DOCTRINE COMPROMISES MODERN EDUCATION
REFORM-AND HOW IT CAN USE THE INLOCO PARENTIS
DOCTRINE TO CHANGE IT
Scott J. Street*
I. INTRODUCTION
America is suffering from an education crisis. Oprah Winfrey knows
it: she spent an entire show talking to Bill and Melinda Gates about how
the couple hopes to revolutionize American education.1 Business leaders
know it: they constantly wonder how children in the richest country on
Earth-a country that devotes billions of dollars to education each
year2 -can rank behind students in Estonia and Hungary on math and
science exams.3 Policymakers know it: they scramble to find ways to
boost student test scores, threatening to close or reorganize schools if
students do not meet expectations.4
The crisis is particularly alarming as the economy shifts from one
centered on the physical capacity of labor to one centered on its
intellectual capacity.' Thirty percent of American teenagers fail to
Juris Doctor, Loyola Law School (Los Angeles), 2008. I owe special thanks to David Burcham,
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1. The Oprah Winfrey Show, Failing Grade,
http://www.oprah.com/tows/slide/200604/20060411/slide_20060411 284 101.jhtml (last visited Apr.
23, 2008).
2. See Dep't of Educ., Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Summary and Background Information, available at
http://www.ed.gov/aboutloverview/budget/budget08/summary/08summary.pdf.
3. See Justin Gillis, Panel Sounds Alarm on Science Education, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at D5
(describing American math and science education as "lagging" behind the rest of the world such that
American students are not being prepared for the "'gathering storm" of foreign competition). In the
third edition of the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), American eighth
graders ranked significantly below Estonia and Hungary in both math and science performance. See
generally Highlights from the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 2003 (Dec.
2004), Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Educ., available at
http://nces.ed.gov/timss/results03.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
4. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (Supp. V. 2005).
5. ACHIEVE, INC., CLOSING THE EXPECTATIONS GAP 2007, at 5, http://www.achieve.org/files/50-state-
07-Final.pdf ("About 67 percent of today's new jobs require some postsecondary education or
25
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finish high school, including nearly half of black and Latino teenagers. 6
The numbers are worse in low income, urban areas. For example, in the
District of Columbia, less than half of students finished high school in
2000. 7  As the economy becomes more sophisticated-and requires
more sophisticated workers-a significant number of young Americans
are at risk of becoming unemployable because they have an inadequate
education.
A number of people have offered solutions to this problem. Yet while
proposals to reform the high school curriculum to emphasize math,
science, and computer skills sound appealing, they will have little
impact if the students at whom they are aimed do not respect the
teachers who instruct them. In this sense, policymakers have
overlooked the fact that the educational "crisis" in America is as much a
"crisis in the legitimacy of school discipline" as anything else. 9 High
school students tend to perform better (both academically and socially)
when they feel that the exercise of discipline at their schools is fair. 10
Fairness, in turn, is "a function of legitimacy and moral authority." 1
But the court decisions that followed Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District 2 have "erod[ed] both student and school
personnel confidence in the legitimate right of a teacher or
administrator to exercise discipline. 1 3  That "hesitation, doubt, and
weakening of conviction.., has undermined the effectiveness of school
discipline" 4 and undermines efforts to reform the public school system
today.
training, and that percentage is expected to rise.").
6. Id. at 7.
7. PAUL E. BARTON, EDUC. TESTING SERV., ONE-THIRD OF A NATION: RISING DROPOUT RATES &
DECLINING OPPORTUNITIES 18 (2005), http://www.ets.org/Media/Education Topics/pdf/onethird.pdf.
8. See ROBERT D. ATKINSON, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., BUILDING SKILLS FOR THE NEW ECONOMY 6
(Apr. 2001), http://www.dlc.org/documents/build skills2.pdf (suggesting school-to-work programs and
math- and science-based magnet schools as two tools that local leaders are already using in some parts
of the country).
9. See RICHARD ARUM, JUDGING SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: THE CRISIS OF MORAL AUTHORITY x (2003). I
am indebted in this endeavor to Richard Arum, whose book offers a very thorough analysis of the way
courts have treated student discipline cases since the 1960s. His account is particularly interesting
(and worth reading by any lawyer) because it is so personal: Mr. Arum spent five years teaching in
the public schools in Oakland, Calif. That experience taught him that school discipline, moral
authority, and socialization were the "core problems facing American public education." Id.
10. Id. at 187.
11. Id.
12. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
13. Id. at 169.
14. Id.
This article urges the Supreme Court to abandon the overprotective
"student speech" doctrine defined by Tinker in favor of an in loco
parentis standard that defers to the expertise of school officials in
maintaining a safe, effective, and orderly school environment. Contrary
to what its critics assume, an in loco parentis standard would not give
school officials carte blanche to violate their students' rights. It would,
for example, prohibit school officials from discriminating against
students on the basis of viewpoint. But as long as Tinker's student
speech doctrine survives, efforts to improve our schools and prepare our
children for the rigors of the twenty-first century will suffer. The in
loco parentis standard recognizes that these efforts are as important as
protecting student speech rights and it therefore tolerates restrictions on
speech to ensure the success of educational reforms.
This concept of "in loco parentis," does not fully embrace the
English notion that parents delegate their authority over their children
to school officials. Rather, Part II describes how that concept evolved
into the American concept of preparing children for their civic roles in
the Republic. It also tracks the way courts treated school disciplinary
policies, from the laissez-faire attitude of nineteenth century judges to
the skepticism of their post-Vietnam counterparts.
Part III explains why reformulating the Court's student discipline
doctrine to emphasize a school's in loco parentis-responsibilities is
necessary to raise academic achievement and ensure that students finish
high school-the most compelling interests in modern education policy.
Part IV considers the counter-arguments and explains why we should not
be as concerned when the government regulates speech in its non-
sovereign capacity, such as when it acts as an educator. It also describes
how the in loco parentis standard properly defers to the authority of
school officials while prohibiting them from disciplining students in a
way that promotes one viewpoint over another. Finally, Part V
compares how a recent student speech cases would have been decided
under the in loco parentis standard. The comparison concludes that an
in loco parentis standard provides as much protection for student speech
rights as the current student speech doctrine without compromising the
ability of educators to control their classrooms.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Historic Rationale for In Loco Parentis and Its Decline
Historically, American students did not have extensive rights once
they stepped through the classroom doors. This may have derived from
the fact that many early American schools (especially high schools,
where we might expect students to start invoking their rights) were
private and therefore not subject to the First Amendment or any other
constitutional provision.15 But attendance at even public schools was
mostly voluntary. 16  Thus, whether public or private, these schools
reflected the strict English model of education, as places that parents
sent their children to learn and be disciplined. 7 Even at the college
level, administrators and faculty asserted total control over students
"both inside and outside the classroom."18  And through the legal
doctrine of in loco parentis, courts mostly refused to get involved in the
student-school relationship, instead deferring to the judgment of school
officials in disciplining students and maintaining order.19
15. E.g., TYLER COWAN, PUBLIC GOODS & MARKET FAILURES 77 (Ryler Cowan, ed., Transaction
Publishers 1992) (1988). Of course, this should not suggest that all education in America was private.
The first free public school in America was established in Dedham, Massachusetts in 1644; GEORGE
WILLLAM HUNTER & WALTER G. WHITMAN, CIVIC SCIENCE IN THE COMMUNITY 272 (American Book
Company 1922). A number of states also provided a free public education to children before the
American Revolution. For example, the Massachusetts colony required that intermediate schools be
established in every town that had at least fifty homes, and it required that every town of at least 100
homes have a grammar school. Id. But the schools we would compare to high schools were primarily
private academies like Andover and Exeter. Id.
16. Massachusetts passed the first compulsory attendance law in 1837-fifty years after the
Constitution was written. E.g.,_Gerald Gutek, Compulsory Education, in HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN EDUCATION, at 95 (Richard J. Altenbaugh ed., 1999).
17. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Because public
schools were initially created as substitutes for private schools, when States developed public
education systems in the early 1800's, no one doubted the government's ability to educate and discipline
children as private schools did. Like their private counterparts, early public schools were not places
for freewheeling debates or exploration of competing ideas. Rather, teachers instilled 'a core of
common values' in students and taught them self-control."); see also Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7
A. 273, 274 (Me. 1886) ("Free political institutions are possible only where the great body of the
people are moral, intelligent, and habituated to self-control, and to obedience to lawful authority. The
permanency of such institutions depends largely upon the efficient instruction and training of children
in these virtues. It is to secure this permanency that the state provides schools and teachers.").
18. Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44
VAND. L. REV. 1135, 1140 (1991).
19. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630-31 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also State v.
Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 365-66 (1837) (describing the in loco parentis rationale and explaining that
judicial review "has confided the graduation of punishments, within the limits of this grant, to the
28
Every state in the union had made education mandatory by 1918.20
That change in the source of school power undercut the argument that
parents had delegated their disciplinary authority to schools and
teachers. 21  After all, how could a parent voluntarily delegate her
authority to discipline her child to a school when the government said
she had to send the child to school? Nevertheless, the in loco parentis
doctrine had become so entrenched that, even after every state had
passed a compulsory attendance law, courts still invoked the doctrine
when refusing to second-guess disciplinary rules and disciplinary decisions
made by school administrators. 22
The law's reliance on in loco parentis surprised a number of legal
scholars, who believed that a change in the source of school authority
would trigger its demise. 23 But what these scholars failed to appreciate
was that courts had largely abandoned the English rationale for the
doctrine in favor of a uniquely American view that justified continued
use of the in loco parentis doctrine as an aspect of the school's role in
"educating the young for citizenship. 124 This political view of in loco
discretion of the teacher."); Patterson v. Nutter, 7 A. at 274 (restating that, under in loco parentis, "[a]
schoolmaster has the right to inflict reasonable corporal punishment"). One author has noted that
judicial deference to school officials under the in loco parentis doctrine was so broad that it
"amounted to blanket judicial approval for all disciplinary actions against students . . . Any rule or
regulation, however broad, was enforced." Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis, supra note 19, at
1147.
20. Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public
Schools, 65 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 49, 71 & n.150 (1996); see also Victoria J. Dodd, American Public
Education and Change: Not An Oxymoron, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 112 (1997).
21. See Paul O. Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 VAND. L. REV. 723, 726-29 (1959) (challenging
use of the in loco parentis rationale to justify corporal punishment in public schools where the law
mandates attendance).
22. Dupre, supra note 21, at 71-72; see also Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366, 369 (D. Vt. 1973)
("Of necessity, parents must delegate some disciplinary authority over their school children to the
teachers who, among other things, are responsible for maintaining the order necessary to the
educational process."); cf People v. Jackson, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731, 736 (N.Y. App. Term 1971)
(referring to in loco parentis, in the Fourth Amendment context, as a doctrine "so compelling in light of
public necessity ... that any action, including a search, taken thereunder upon reasonable suspicion
should be accepted as necessary and reasonable.").
23. See, e.g., Proehl, supra note 22, at 726-27 (arguing that in loco parentis "hardly fits a system of
compulsory public education, when neither parent nor child has any choice in the matter, and where,
if order is to be maintained, an implied and irrevocable delegation of authority would have to be
wrested from the parents by some legal fiction").
24. W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). This view of the in locoparentis
doctrine seems to have arisen out of the "social reproduction" model of schooling that education
reformers promoted in the early twentieth century; see Dupre, supra note 23, at 67-68 ("In fact, the
student depends on his relationship with school and teacher, much like his relationship with his parents,
to provide him with the qualities necessary to be a responsible citizen in the social compact and to
participate in our popular form of government.").
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parentis mimicked the "social reproduction" model of education
promoted by twentieth century education reformers, who argued that
"the student depends on his relationship with school and teacher, much
like his relationship with his parents, to provide him with the qualities
necessary to be a responsible citizen. '25  And it must have seemed
particularly appealing to courts in the 1940s and 1950s, as Americans
fought fascism abroad and communism at home-institutions that
government officials believed would threaten the very foundation of
American democracy. 26
Then came the 1960s. A decade well known for its dramatic political
and cultural changes, the '60s also saw a dramatic increase in educational
litigation. 27  Prior to 1965, few individuals used the legal system to
challenge school disciplinary rules, especially at the appellate level. 28
More tried from 1965 to 1968, perhaps inspired by the Fifth Circuit's
decision to enjoin Mississippi school officials from punishing students
25. See Dupre, supra note 23, at 67-68, 72 (arguing that the Supreme Court's pre-Tinker
interpretation of in loco parentis reflected the social reproduction model of education). Professor
Dupre's analogy of the student-school relationship to the child-parent relationship should not confuse
you. This political vision of in loco parentis differs from the source of power theory driving courts in
the nineteenth century: rather than stressing the source of power, it stresses the nature of the school's
responsibility to "maintain[ ] the existing democratic order." V.T. THAYER, FORMATIVE IDEAS IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION: FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE PRESENT 323 (1965). As Dupre notes,
the social reproductionists were largely influenced by Horace Mann, the "Father" of the American
public school, who said that "' [t]he theory of our government is---not that all men, however unfit, shall
be voters---but that every man, by the power of reason and the sense of duty [obtained through
education], shall become fit to be a voter."' Dupre, supra note 23, at 69 (quoting Horace Mann, The
Lecture on Education in JOY ELMER MORGAN, HORACE MANN: HIS IDEAS AND IDEALS 97-98 (1936)
(alteration in orginal).
26. Cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) (concluding that the federal
government could intern Japanese-Americans during World War II so long as the government's
reason for doing so did not fall short of "apprehension by the proper military authorities of the gravest
imminent danger to the public safety," a judgment that the Court deferred to). Other officials used the
in loco parentis doctrine to specifically exclude Communist speakers from public schools. For
example, officials at Queens College in New York used the doctrine of in loco parentis to justify
banning the appearance of John Gates, editor of the socialist Daily Worker; see SETH CAGIN & PHILIP
DRAY, WE ARE NOT AFRAID: THE STORY OF GOODMAN, SCHWEMER, AND CHANEY AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOR MISSISSIPPI 101 (1988). Indeed, in the facts that gave rise to the Tinker case,
athletic coaches at one of the Des Moines high schools suggested that the students who wore black
armbands to class were Communist sympathizers who might be attacked at school for showing a "lack
of patriotism." JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS: TINKER V. DES MOINES AND
THE 1960s 8 (1997). And in 1950, the president of the Chicago Board of Education formed a
committee to study ways that teachers could promote patriotism and fight Communism in the
classroom. John F. Lyons, Cold War and Anti-Communism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHICAGO 184
(James R. Grossman, et al., eds., 2004).
27. See ARUM, supra note 10, at 8.
28. Id. at 17.
who wore "freedom buttons" at school.2 9  And in 1965, Congress
established the Office of Economic Opportunity to lead President
Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty. 30 Although Congress did not
initially refer to legal services when it created the OEO, the agency
immediately started funding legal services for the poor 31 and Congress
emphasized the provision of legal services when it amended the
Economic Opportunity Act in 1966 and 1967, creating a discrete Legal
Services program in the 1967 amendments. 32
Congress did not simply authorize the provision of legal services to
help poor Americans; it directed the Legal Services program to "further
the cause of justice among persons living in poverty" by generally
"mobilizing the assistance of lawyers and legal institutions.' 33 And the
men who led the program interpreted their mandate broadly, as a
mission to "uncover the legal causes of poverty, remodel the systems
which generate the cycle of poverty and design new social, legal and
political tools and vehicles to move poor people from deprivation,
depression, and despair to opportunity, hope, and ambition. '34
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Legal Services program and the
public interest law firms that it funded increasingly challenged school
rules and administrators whose disciplinary decisions infringed students'
speech rights. 35 Their efforts were largely fueled by young attorneys
who had recent experience with the education system 36 and rules that
had become particularly strict and arbitrarily enforced during the first
29. See Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1966).
30. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508, 528.
31. See ALAN W. HOuSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CENTER FOR LAW & SOCIAL POLICY, SECURING
EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 7
(2003) (noting that the OEO's first director, Sargent Shriver, funded legal services in the early days of
the OEO, even though the Economic Opportunity Act did not mention such services).
32. Id.; see also Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1966, Pub L. No. 89-794, 80 Stat. 1451, 1461-
62 (1966) (directing OEO to develop legal services programs for the poor); Economic Opportunity
Amendments of 1967, Pub L. No. 90-222, 81 Stat. 672, 698-99 (1967) (creating the "Legal Services"
program).
33. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, 81 Stat. at 698 (emphasis added).
34. E. Clinton Bamberger, Former Dir. Of OEO Legal Services, Address to the National Conference
of Bar Presidents (Feb. 19, 1966), reprinted in Harry P. Stumpf, Law & Poverty: A Political
Perspective, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 694, 711-12 (1968). Clinton Bamberger was the first national director
of the OEO's Legal Services program. ARuM, supra note 10, at 8.
35. ARJM, supra note 10, at 17.
36. These young attorneys included Hillary Rodham, who advocated using legal challenges as a
means of children's advocacy when she worked as an attorney for the Children's Defense Fund. See
generally Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law,43 HARV. EDUC. REv. 487 (1973).
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part of the Cold War and the civil rights movement.37 They flooded the
nation's appellate courts with litigation over school discipline rules.
While few cases challenging those rules existed before 1960, and only
seventy-two appeared between 1960 and 1968, seventy-six school
discipline cases per year were argued in the federal and state appellate
courts between 1969 and 1975.38 As one scholar has noted, "[t]here
were likely more challenges to school discipline in the case law records
of 1969 and 1970 alone[ ] than in all of American history combined. '39
B. Tinker v. Des Moines and The Fall of the In Loco Parentis Doctrine
Despite the zealous advocacy of law firms funded by the Legal Service
program, the case that sparked the decline of the in loco parentis
doctrine was not brought by an organization affiliated with that
program. Rather, the case that would become known as Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District was filed by Dan
Johnston, a young Iowa attorney who worked in a two-person Des
Moines law firm and was active in the Iowa Civil Liberties Union
("ICLU"). 40 Johnston's fee amounted to no more than a few hundred
dollars, but he would become famous as the public face of the Tinker
plaintiffs when the case made its way to the Supreme Court. 41
Tinker arose out of the defining event of the 1960s: The Vietnam
War. The United States began fighting in Southeast Asia in 1961, and
by the end of 1965, 170,000 American soldiers were stationed in
Vietnam and over 1,000 soldiers had died in the conflict. 42 In November
1965, an estimated 25,000 people descended on Washington, D.C., to
protest America's continued involvement in Vietnam. 43 The protest
was noteworthy for its moderation: Speakers included civil libertarians
and civil rights leaders like Coretta Scott King, not militants or
37. For example, the Fifth Circuit noted in Burnside that while the school prohibited students from
wearing "freedom buttons," it did not prohibit the wearing of other buttons, including buttons that
promoted the Beatles rock band and buttons that contained the initials of students. Burnside v. Byars,
363 F.2d 744, 746 n.2 (1966). In Tinker, the Supreme Court noted that the Des Moines schools allowed
students to wear all kinds of propaganda, including political campaign buttons and even the Nazi Iron
Cross. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969).
38. Arum, supra note 10, at 17-18.
39. Id.
40. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 62.
41. See id. at3
42. See generally id. at 1.
43. Id.
extremist student leaders. 44 Protest monitors urged marchers to hide
signs that called for such extreme positions as "American surrender or
withdrawal. '45 Instead, the activists championed more moderate ideas,
including a call by New York Senator Robert F. Kennedy to extend the
planned Christmas truce to allow additional time for peace
negotiations .46
Among the 25,000 marchers were Iowa teenagers Christopher
Eckhardt and John Tinker.47 Eckhardt and Tinker returned from the
march energized. Their parents held a meeting with other community
activists on December 11, 1965, to find a way for the students to
express their disagreement with the nation's Vietnam policy. 48 They
ultimately decided to wear black armbands to school as a sign of
protest. 49 The protest was scheduled to occur on Thursday, December
16, 1965-and a fellow student who attended the Tinker/Eckhadt
meeting wrote an article for one of the school's newspapers announcing
the plan.50  The student's journalism teacher refused to publish the
article; however, until the students talked with the principal or another
school official. 51 The student eventually spoke with two Des Moines
school district officials, who said they would not allow the article to be
published.52
It turned out the article was not necessary to alert students to the
protest, and word about the black armbands spread throughout the Des
Moines schools. 53 On Tuesday, December 14, the principals of five Des
Moines high schools-at the urging of the district's superintendent-
hastily called a meeting to determine how they would respond to the
protests.5 4  They decided to ban the armbands in Des Moines's
secondary schools. 55 Notably, the school district had never adopted a
policy regarding the wearing of armbands specifically or political
symbols generally: In fact, the Des Moines school board had to hold
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id.
46. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 3.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 5.
51. Id. at6.
52. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 6.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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several meetings in December 1965 and January 1966 to ratify the
armband ban. 56 Rather, the high school principals based their decision
on the "general school policy against 'anything that... [presents] a
disturbing situation within the school. "', 57
That did not dissuade the Eckhardts or Tinkers, though. Chris
Eckhardt went to school on December 16 wearing the black armband.58
Knowing that the high school principals had resolved to punish anybody
who wore an armband to school that day, Eckhardt immediately turned
himself in to the principal's office. 59 One of the school officials who
spoke with him tried to convince Eckhardt to remove the armband,
saying that the suspension would look bad on his record, that he was
"too young to have opinions," and that "colleges didn't accept
protestors so if... [he] planned to go to college that... [he'd] better take
it off. ' 60 When Eckhardt refused to remove the armband, the school
suspended him.61 A similar scenario played out at Harding Junior High
School, where John Tinker's sister Mary Beth was suspended for wearing
a black armband to school and refusing to remove it.62 Finally, on
Friday, December 17, John Tinker was not permitted to attend his high
school after wearing a black armband to class and refusing to remove
it. 6
3
The Tinkers and Eckhardts did not immediately sue the school district
for violating their constitutional rights. 64 After all, the school district
did not have a formal policy that governed the wearing of armbands-
the high school principals had informally decided to prohibit the wearing
of armbands to protest the Vietnam War and to suspend any student who
defied them as violating a school order.65 The school board had to ratify
the decision before the families took any legal action. 66 It did so early
56. Id. at 34 (noting that the school board "had not conceived the policy prohibiting armbands. The
high school principals and the director of secondary education had crafted it without consultation with
the board").
57. Id. at 6 (alteration in original).
58. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 16.
59. Id. at 16-17.
60. Id. at 17 (omissions and alterations in original) (additional quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id. at 19-20.
63. Id. at 24-25.
64. See id. at 34.
65. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 34.
66. See id. at 30 (noting that "no legal challenge to school policy on armbands could be mounted until
the school board had officially had the opportunity to vote on the ban").
the next month, holding two open meetings to consider the ban before
upholding the policy by a 5-2 vote on January 3, 1966.67 The Tinkers
and Eckhardts, assisted by the ICLU, filed a complaint against the Des
Moines Independent Community School District in federal court on
March 14, 1966, arguing that the school district's armband policy
violated the First Amendment. 68
The district court in the Southern District of Iowa dismissed the
complaint. 69 It reasoned that, while the armband wearing constituted
protected symbolic speech, the school district could prohibit it.70
Interestingly, to reach that decision, the court relied on the deferential
clear and present danger test that the Supreme Court used to uphold the
convictions of Communist Party leaders in Dennis v. United States.71
That test asks "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger. ' 72 The district court easily found that the school
district's actions, which it viewed as necessary to "maintaining a
scholarly, disciplined atmosphere within the classroom," satisfied the
clear and present danger test, and were not patently unreasonable. 73 It
also rejected the Fifth Circuit's judgment, delivered in Burnside, that a
school official should not infringe a student's right to speak unless the
exercise of the right "'materially and substantially interfere[s] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.' ' 74 In the district court's opinion, "[s]chool officials must be
given a wide discretion and if, under the circumstances, a disturbance in
67. Id. at 45. The school board also held an informal (some would say "secret") meeting between the
two public hearings, where it discussed the armband policy with its attorney, Allan Herrick. Id. at 41-
42. For a thorough description of all three meetings, see John Johnson's elaborate account of the
Tinker controversy. Id. at 31-47.
68. Id. at 67-68.
69. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972-73 (S.D. Iowa) ("Tinker/"),
reversed by Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For the purposes of
this section, I refer to the district court's Tinker-decision as Tinker I, the Eighth Circuit's decision as
Tinker II, and the Supreme Court's decision as Tinker III. In the rest of the article, any references to
"Tinker" refer to the Supreme Court's opinion in the case.
70. Tinker 1, 258 F.Supp. at 972-73.
71. Id. at 972; see also ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, § 8.3.2, at 340 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that, in Dennis, the "clear and present danger test
seemed to veer away from the speech-protective model" and "applied a formula that was more
deferential to governmental interests").
72. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (Vinson, C.J., plurality opinion) (quoting United
States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,212 (2d Cir. 1950)) (additional quotation marks omitted).
73. Tinker 1, 258 F. Supp. at 972-73.
74. Id. at 973 (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749).
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school discipline is reasonably to be anticipated, actions which are
reasonably calculated to prevent such a disruption must be upheld by the
Court. '75  A divided en banc panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed that decision. 76
The Tinkers and Eckhardts filed their petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court on January 17, 1968. 77 The Court granted the petition
on March 4.78 Notably, two of the Court's strongest civil libertarians,
Justices Hugo Black and Abe Fortas (who would eventually write the
Tinker opinion), voted to deny certiorari. 79 Fortas, for one, was not
convinced at the time that the courts should second-guess disciplinary
decisions made by school officials, unless the decision was clearly
arbitrary or discriminatory.80 He would change his mind after the case
was argued though and, on February 24, 1969, the Supreme Court
reversed the district court's decision.8 1 Justice Fortas wrote the majority
opinion.8 2
For a case that is almost universally regarded as destroying the in loco
parentis doctrine, it is interesting that the Tinker opinion never uses that
phrase. Perhaps the Court did not need to mention it. After all, it did
say that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech at the schoolhouse
gate. '83 Many commentators interpreted that language as destroying
the in loco parentis doctrine sub silentio.84 In reality, Tinker's message
was more subtle than that. The test it developed did not seem overly
75. Id.
76. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988, 988 (8th Cir. 1967) (per curiam)
("Tinker I'), reversed by Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). There
is no transcript of either oral argument that occurred before the Eighth Circuit in the Tinker case;
however, John Johnson's description of the controversy provides an excellent account of the
arguments. His account is drawn from interviews with the attorneys and parties, the few newspaper
reports that covered the events, and the parties' appellate briefs. See JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 110-
20.
77. Johnson, supra note 27, at 123.
78. Id. at 128.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 129.
81. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) ("Tinker III').
82. Id. at 504.
83. Id. at 506.
84. See Dupre, supra note 21, at 60 ("When the Tinker Court declared that constitutional rights
followed students through the schoolhouse gate, the notion that school power was like that of a
parent-the common law doctrine of in loco parentis-slipped out the back door."); see also Harvard
Law Review Ass'n, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term: School Searches, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 235 &
n.13 (1985) (recapping the Court's "rejection of the in locoparentis doctrine").
restrictive. It did not inquire into the motivation that school officials
had for prohibiting certain speech. It did not even purport to challenge
a school's ability to prohibit group demonstrations,85 which are at the
very heart of the First Amendment. 86 Tinker merely required that a
school show that the activity it was punishing "would 'materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school."' ' 87 The school need not prove those by
clear and convincing evidence or even a preponderance: the Court
simply demanded that school officials show that they "had reason to
anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere
with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students." 88  The Des Moines schools failed that test because they
punished the Tinker and Eckhardt children "for a silent, passive
expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance." 89
Moreover, the Tinker decision was as much a product of its time as
anything else, a reaction against blatant viewpoint-based discrimination
regarding a sensitive topic. For example, the Court noted that the
school district had not prohibited the wearing of other symbols at
school, but rather convened quickly to prohibit the expression of a
politically unpopular opinion regarding the Vietnam War. 90 And the
school district apparently had no problem with student expression that
promoted American involvement in the Vietnam War. Christopher
Eckhardt recalled that the gym teachers and coaches at Roosevelt High
School encouraged students to chant "Beat the Vietcong" during their
calisthenics exercises after news broke of the armband plan. 91  The
majority criticized the Des Moines school district for the double-
standard, stating that schools "may not be enclaves of totalitarianism,"
where school officials have total control over their students and
transform them into "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate" those messages which are "officially
85. See Tinker II, 393 U.S. at 508.
86. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) ("[I]mplicit in the right to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment is a corresponding right to associate with others
in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.")
(additional quotation marks omitted).
87. Tinker III, 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Tinker III, 393 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 5 10-11.
91. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 7-8. One of the coaches later said that this chant "sprang from the
students themselves," but that the coaches decided not to stop the chant because the students were
"proving their Americanism." Id. at 8 (additional quotation marks omitted).
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approved. '92  This country did not develop its school systems to
"'foster a homogenous people.' ''93
Nonetheless, most courts construed Tinker in the broadest possible
terms. 94 Nowhere was that more apparent than in a case in the Ninth
Circuit called Fraser v. Bethel School District No. 403.95
C. Fraser's Attempt to Revive In Loco Parentis
Fraser arose out of a high school assembly speech filled with sexual
innuendo. The facts of the case were very simple. The student, a
seventeen year-old high school senior named Matthew Fraser, delivered
the following speech to nominate a classmate for a student government
position:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's
firm in his shirt, his character is firm-but most of all, his
belief in you, the students of Bethel is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds
it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the
wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard,
pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the
climax, for each and every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for ASB vice-president-he'll never
come between you and the best our high school can be.96
Predictably, some students responded to the speech in a raucous
manner. Some "hooted and yelled. '97 Some graphically simulated the
92. Tinker III. at 511.
93. Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
94. See, e.g., Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1977) (arguing that Tinker put the
burden on school officials to show a "reasonable basis for interference with student speech" where
"bare allegation that such a basis existed" will not suffice and concluding that, in a situation that
involves potential psychological disruption, Tinker-required that the school demonstrate that the
psychological harm would have been "significant" (emphasis added)).
95. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Fraiser II).
96. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Fraser If'). As with the
previous section, I refer to the district court's decision in Fraser as Fraser I, the Ninth Circuit's
decision as Fraser II, and the Supreme Court's decision as Fraser III. Unless otherwise noted, all
other references to "Fraser" in this article refer to the Supreme Court's decision.
97. Id. at 1359.
sexual acts that Fraser's speech alluded to.98  Others just seemed
bewildered and embarrassed by Fraser's remarks, causing at least one
teacher to cancel part of her lesson the next day to discuss the speech. 99
The day after he delivered his speech, Fraser was called to the
assistant principal's office and given notice that the school would
suspend him for violating its disruptive conduct policy.100  That rule
prohibited students from engaging in conduct that materially and
substantially interfered with the educational process, "including the use
of obscene, profane language or gestures." 10 1  The assistant principal
gave Fraser an opportunity to explain his conduct, then suspended him
for three days and denied him a chance to speak at his commencement
ceremony. 102
After filing a grievance action with the superintendent of the school
district (which was denied), Fraser sued the Bethel School District.103
The district judge determined that the school district had violated
Fraser's First Amendment rights by punishing him for delivering the
speech.10 4 The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision. In its view, the
school district "failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Fraser's
use of sexual innuendo in the nominating speech substantially disrupted
or materially interfered in any way with the educational process."105
Although Fraser's speech had elicited a lively response from the student
audience, the court seemed to think that most school assemblies produce
some kind of response from their audience, and it found no evidence to
suggest that Fraser's speech caused disorder or delayed the assembly in
any way.106 The fact that several teachers and school officials found
Fraser's speech "inappropriate" did not concern the court: "The mere
fact that some members of the school community considered Fraser's
speech to be inappropriate does not necessarily mean it was disruptive of
the educational process. The First Amendment standard Tinker requires
us to apply is material disruption, not inappropriateness." 10 7 The court
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1360.
100. Id. at 1357.
101. Id. atn.1.
102. Fraser H, 755 F.2d at 1357.
103. Id. at 1358.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1359.
106. Id. at 1360.
107. Id. at 1361.
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also refused to give the school district the authority to prohibit
"indecent" speech in the school setting, saying that it "fear[ed] that if
school officials had the unbridled discretion to apply a standard as
subjective and elusive as 'indecency' in controlling the speech of high
school students, it would increase the risk of cementing white, middle-
class standards for determining what is acceptable and proper speech and
behavior in our public schools." 10 8
The Supreme Court, which had not decided a student speech case in
the sixteen years since Tinker, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. It
corrected the broad interpretation of Tinker that courts like the Fraser
panel had drawn, saying that Tinker does not preclude all discipline of
students for speaking. 109  For example, it contrasted the "political
message" of the speech that was punished in Tinker and the "sexual
content" of the speech at issue in Fraser.110 In a sense, the Court
viewed the sexual content of Fraser's speech, delivered to a captive
assembly audience, to be inherently disruptive and open to punishment
under the Tinker standard.1
But rather than simply justify its decision under Tinker, as Justices
Blackmun and Brennan would have done,112 the Court wrote sweepingly
about the school's authority to promote "'fundamental values necessary
to the maintenance of a democratic political system.'1113 These values
included consideration of the "sensibilities of others, and, in the case of
a school, the sensibilities of fellow students. 11 4 Why give the school
boards the authority to operate a heckler's veto system?11 5 The Court
108. Fraser II, 755 F.2d at 1363. In this way, Bethel School District tried to convince the court that it
should extend the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), to the school
setting but the Ninth Circuit rejected those efforts, finding no analogue between the rationale for
restricting indecent speech in broadcasting and the rationale for restricting such speech in the school
setting. Fraser II, 755 F.2d at 1363.
109. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986) ("Fraser III").
110. Id.
111. See id. at 688-89 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[H]igh school students may properly be
reprimanded for giving a speech at a high school assembly which school officials conclude disrupted
the school's educational mission." (footnote omitted)).
112. See id.
113. Id. at 681 (majority opinion) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. Under the heckler's veto theory, courts have refused to give the government authority to
prohibit or punish speech based solely on the reaction of third parties to the speech. See, e.g., Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 32 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he mere fact that he disagrees with this part of the Pledge [of Allegiance] does not
give him a veto power over the decision of the public schools that willing participants should pledge
allegiance to the flag in the manner prescribed by Congress.").
justified its decision under the modern in loco-parentis doctrine, the
version that reflected the reproductive model of "'[public education
[as] prepar[ing] pupils for citizenship in the Republic... inculcat[ing] the
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to
happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government."' ' 116
Under that doctrine, the Court deferred to the schools' authority in
"teach[ing] by example the shared values of a civilized social order,"
including the determination that "civil, mature conduct cannot be
conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech
and conduct.. .' 117
Fraser's revival of the in loco parentis doctrine marked an important
step in the Court's treatment of student rights cases. Although the
Court had discussed the doctrine a year earlier when it upheld the right of
schools to search students for drugs based only on reasonable suspicion
and without a warrant, 1 it rejected the doctrine as "in tension with
contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court."119 Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion in Fraser challenged that statement and
instead "recognize[d] the obvious concern on the part of parents, and
school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children-
especially in a captive audience-from exposure to sexually explicit,
indecent, or lewd speech."1 20
Unfortunately, while invoking the in loco parentis rationale, the
Chief Justice's opinion seemed more concerned with the sexual character
of Fraser's speech, perhaps reflecting the The Chief Justice's personal
concerns about teaching human sexuality in the classroom. For
example, the Chief Justice described Fraser as a "confused boy" whose
"plainly offensive" speech was "acutely insulting to teenage girl
students" and potentially "damaging" to the assembly's less mature
audience.1 21 He compared the sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech to
sexually explicit speech, which the Court has given States broad
authority to regulate with
116. Fraser III, 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
117. Id. at683.
118. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-42 (1985).
119. Id. at 336.
120. Fraser III, 478 U.S. at 684.
121. Id. at683.
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respect to minors, 122 although another justice noted that Fraser's speech
did not come near the explicitness of speech regulated in cases like
Ginsberg v. New York and FCC v.Pacifica Foundation.123
Burger's obsession with the sexual character of Fraser's speech
trivialized his revival of the in loco parentis doctrine. It also caused
enormous confusion in the lower courts. Some courts read Fraser to
only apply to lewd or indecent speech, speech characterized by its sexual
and offensive content.1 24  Others read Fraser as hinging not on the
content of the message being conveyed but on the manner and location
of its delivery, more tied to the inherent disruptiveness of the speech
than the message delivered.1 25 Some read Fraser both ways. The Ninth
Circuit panel in Morse v. Frederick, for example, construed Fraser as
allowing schools to prohibit "sexual speech," but it never seemed to
figure out whether that inquiry focused on the content or the manner of
the speech, highlighted by the fact that the panel distinguished the
"sexual nature" of the speech that disrupted the school assembly and
thus was not protected in Fraser_with the "political viewpoint of the
speech protected in Tinker.1 26
Of course, a few judges recognized that the Fraser analysis, with its
revival of in loco parentis, suggested that "the Government's interest in
protecting children extends beyond shielding them from physical and
psychological harm" and encompasses protecting children "from
exposure to materials that would 'impair[] [their] ethical and moral
development."'1 27  But those judges were the exception to the rule.
122. Id. at 684-85.
123. Fraser III, 478 U.S. at n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
124. See Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213 (3d Cir. 2001) ("According to
Fraser, then, there is no First Amendment protection for 'lewd,' 'vulgar,' 'indecent,' and 'plainly
offensive' speech in school.").
125. See E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d
1166, 1193 (D. Utah 1999) ("Fraser speaks to the form and manner of student speech, not its
substance. It addresses the mode of expression, not its content or viewpoint."); see also Brief of
Respondent at 26, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278) ("In short, Fraser is a case
about lewd speech that caused actual disruption in a school-sponsored assembly containing a captive
audience of adolescent students. None of those factors is present here. Frederick's speech was not
lewd or sexually suggestive. It did not cause actual disruption, and it did not take place in a school-
sponsored speech forum.").
126. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (additional quotation
marks omitted).
127. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684, and quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968)) (alterations
and emphasis in original).
Indeed,
just two years after the Court decided Fraser, in the final installment of
the Court's student speech trilogy, Justice Byron White interpreted
Fraser in extremely narrow terms, holding
a student could be disciplined for having delivered a
speech that was 'sexually explicit' but not legally
obscene at an official school assembly, because the
school was entitled to 'disassociate itself from the
speech in a manner that would demonstrate to others
that such vulgarity is "'wholly inconsistent with the
'fundamental values' of public school education." 128
He never mentioned the words in loco parentis.
D. How Drugs Got In Loco Parentis Back on the Supreme Court's Good
Side
Although few judges used Chief Justice Burger's in loco parentis
rationale in student speech cases, the Supreme Court seized on it to give
schools more power to attack the growing problem of student drug use.
The drug cases offer guidance to school officials who would like to
convince the Court that they need a legal standard like in loco parentis
to attack the broad social problems being confronted in modern public
schools.
Drug use by high school students peaked in the 1970s and early 1980s:
in 1985, more than a quarter of children between the ages of twelve and
seventeen reported using an illicit drug, thirteen percent within the
previous month. 129 Particularly alarming was the changing character of
drug use by high school students and the ease with which they could
obtain and use drugs. While children in the 1970s might have retreated
to their basements to smoke pot and burned incense to cover up the
strong smell, 130 children in the 1980s and 1990s could achieve a similar
high by quickly ingesting cocaine or amphetamines. Students
128. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1988) (emphasis added).
129. Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, Drug Use Trends (2002), available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/druguse/drugusetrends.pdf.
130. See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Wis. 2000) ("When the strong smell of
marijuana is in the air, there is a 'fair probability' that marijuana is present. This is common sense.").
43
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increasingly used and dealt drugs at school-a situation that the Supreme
Court responded to by allowing school officials to conduct warrantless
searches of their students on less than probable cause. 131 Of course, it
was easy to understand the Court's decision to downplay the privacy
rights of children in New Jersey v. T.L. 0.: Drug use and drug dealing that
occurred on school grounds was illegal and few people believed that a
school district should not have the authority to combat illegal activity
on school grounds based on reasonable suspicion. 132 But what about drug
use that occurs in the family basement, with drugs that the students
bought on the street, not in the school halls? In Vernonia, Oregon, for
example, school officials maintained that drug use generally led to an
increase in discipline problems: Students acted more violently at school
and became increasingly rude during class. 133  Football players, who
coaches feared were leading the drug culture, seemed to suffer more
severe injuries than normal and react more slowly on the playing
field. 134 Searching those students for drugs did not solve anything since
the drugs were rarely used or dealt at school. 135 But did the school's
concerns for the health of those student athletes give the school the
right to test them for drugs without any suspicion whatsoever?
The Supreme Court said yes. In doing so, it relied on the reduced
expectation of privacy that students have when they participate in
131. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-42 (1985). In TL.O., a teacher had found two girls
smoking cigarettes in a school restroom during school hours. Id. at 328. A subsequent search of
T.L.O.'s purse revealed marijuana, a pipe, several small plastic bags used to distribute marijuana, and
a "substantial quantity" of money in dollar bills. Id.
132. See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (weighing the student's privacy interest against the "substantial
interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school
grounds"); cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (suggesting that
schools can regulate student speech that "would materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" (additional quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added)).
133. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1995) (listing these conclusions
offered by school officials in Vernonia, Oregon). The Supreme Court suggested that some teachers
and staff in Vernonia observed students using drugs at school, see id. at 649, although the briefs
suggest that the officials actually saw them using drugs at a restaurant near the high school, see Brief
of Petitioner at 5, Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646 (No. 94-590). While school officials confiscated drug
paraphernalia on school grounds, overheard students boasting about their drug use on school grounds,
and listened to some students admit that they had used drugs, it appears that much of the actual drug
dealing and drug use in Vernonia occurred off-campus. See id. at 5-6 (noting, for example, that "five
of the high school's best athletes cut classes to hold a party and were arrested for drinking alcohol and
using marijuana").
134. Id. at 649.
135. See id. (noting that the Vernonia school officials brought a drug-sniffing dog into its schools but
the drug problem persisted).
interscholastic athletics. 13 6 After all, "[s]chool sports are not for the
bashful," the Court said. "They require 'suiting up' before each practice
or event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public school locker
rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy
they afford. ' 137 Of course, the fact that student athletes got naked in
the locker room seems to have little bearing on whether they had a
legitimate expectation in not having their urine tested for drugs. So
Justice Antonin Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Vernonia,
relied on more than that. He argued that, while the Court had "rejected
the notion that public schools, like private schools, exercise only
parental power over their students," it had "emphasized[] that the
nature of that power is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults. 1 38
And he reformulated the in loco parentis debate, stating that, while
schools do not have a general "'duty to protect"' their students,1 39 they
frequently must act "in loco parentis, with the power and indeed the
duty to 'inculcate the habits and manners of civility.' '1 40 That interest
justified the school's decision to take reasonable steps to prevent drug
use among its students.
Interestingly, Scalia's discussion of the in loco parentis rationale was
probably unnecessary to resolve Vernonia: students who wished to play
football at the high school had to submit to a preseason physical exam
and give a urine sample, and they had to comply with all sorts of rules
governing their conduct, grades, dress, and insurance coverage.1 41  In
that sense, they had voluntarily chosen to participate in a heavily
regulated industry, to which the Court has traditionally given more
leeway in search and seizure cases.1 42 But Scalia's opinion sent a clear
message. The Court would not just defer to school policies that
combated drug use because drug use disrupted the educational process.
Rather, schools had an interest in deterring drug use by children because
136. Id. at 657.
137. Id.
138. Id. at655.
139. Id. at 655 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989)).
140. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 684 (1986)) (additional
quotation marks omitted).
141. Id. at 657.
142. Id.; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989) ("[T]he
expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an
industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety.").
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drugs were bad for them.1 43
III. USING INLOCO PARENTIS TO IMPROVE ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT
AND BETTER PREPARE STUDENTS FOR THE NEW ECONOMY
Of course, most Americans believe that drug use is a serious problem
that school officials should have leeway to combat. 144 But why give
school officials greater discretion in disciplining students generally?
That could compromise an important goal of our public education
system at the high school level: Instilling in teenagers the constitutional
values that define American democracy.1 45 But the way the courts have
protected student speech rights-by second-guessing school officials and
placing a high burden on them to justify discipline-has eroded the
moral authority that teachers and administrators have to control their
classrooms.1 46 That erosion of authority has made public high schools a
more difficult place to learn and has compromised the ability of public
schools to adequately prepare American children for the challenges they
will face in the twenty-first century.
A. Cause for Concern: How American Students Are Falling Behind Their
International Counterparts Academically at the Worst Possible
Time
To be fair, there is some dispute in social science and policy circles
about whether American education is really suffering from a "crisis." On
the one hand, Jay Greene and Marcus Winters-respected researchers at
the Manhattan Institute who have been studying and writing about
education issues for years-report that nearly thirty percent of
teenagers failed to earn a high school diploma in 2002, including nearly
143. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661-62.
144. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Americans' Views on Children's Health, 280 JAMA 2122, 2122
(Dec. 23, 1998) (describing how, in a 1997 study, 56 percent of respondents identified drugs or drug
abuse as one of the two or three most serious problems facing children in the United States, by far the
most common response).
145. See, e.g., Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985) ("'The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools .... The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out
of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."' (quoting Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487, 603 (1960)) (alteration in original)).
146. ARUM, supra note 10, at 13.
half of African-American and Hispanic students. 147 But an economist at
the Economic Policy Institute has criticized those figures and called the
conventional belief that America is in an education crisis
"exaggerated." 148 He cites U.S. Census Bureau data that indicates that
eighty to ninety percent of Americans have a high school diploma,
including seventy to eighty percent of African-Americans.1 49
Regardless of who has more accurate data, the fact remains that
American teenagers do not demonstrate the same level of academic
achievement as their international counterparts. 50 For example, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a
consortium based in Paris that studies and compares economic and social
statistics in its 30 member countries, 51 calculates the secondary school
completion rate at 76 percent for American students.15 2 That ranks
lower than the 82 percent average in OECD member countries and
significantly lower than the 87 percent average in the OECD's European
Union members. 53  The percentage of American students finishing
secondary school surpassed just four of the twenty-two OECD nations
that reported secondary-school completion rates: Mexico, New Zealand,
Spain, and Turkey.1 54 And those graduation rates capture only part of
the problem: A recent study showed that just thirty-four percent of
American students who entered high school as the Class of 2002 finished
high school ready to attend college.1 55
147. JAY P. GREENE & MARCUS A. WINTERS, PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION & COLLEGE
READNESS RATES: 1991-2002 1 (Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research, Educ. Working Paper No. 8),
available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/ewp_08.pdf.
148. Lawrence Mishel, The Exaggerated Dropout Crisis, EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 8, 2006, at 40, available
at http://www.epinet.org/content.cfin/webfeatures-viewpoints dropout-crisis.
149. See Id.
150. See Int'l Comparisons of Academic Achievement, Alliance for Educ., Sept. 2007, available at
http://www.all4ed.org/files/IntlCompFactSheet.pdf ("In virtually every international assessment of
academic proficiency, the United States' performance varies from mediocre to poor [], particularly
for secondary school students.").
151. See generally About the OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en 36734052_36734103 1 1 1 11,00.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2007).
152. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Education at a Glance 2007, at 50 (2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/55/39313286.pdf.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Greene & Winters, supra note 150, at 8. By "college-readiness," Greene and Winters mean that
a student cleared three hurdles. First, she must have received a regular high school diploma. Second,
she must have passed four years of English, three years of math, and two years each of a natural
science, social science, and foreign language. Finally, the student must have been "basically literate,"
demonstrated by testing at least at the basic level of the reading assessment offered by the National
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The gap between American students and their international
counterparts is particularly alarming because the global economy has
shifted from one based on the physical capacity of the workforce to one
based on intellectual capacity. According to one report, sixty-seven
percent of today's new jobs require some sort of post-secondary
education or training-a number that is only expected to rise.1 56 As a
result, "meeting high educational standards has become a prerequisite for
economic growth and social inclusion in the 21st century" and the
failure to meet those standards leaves workers with little chance of
finding a good-paying job.1 57 The OECD found that in
2005, just fifty-seven percent of the American workforce had less than
a high school education.1 58 And even those who did find jobs face a less
stable economic environment.1 59
These trends are alarming on a theoretical level, but their most
serious consequence could be the destruction of the American middle
class, long regarded as the backbone of the dominant American
economy. As one report has noted, "jobs that pay well and support a
middle-class lifestyle now require higher-level skills than ever before. If
U.S. workers cannot meet the demand, U.S. competitiveness will
diminish, negatively affecting the living standards of millions of
citizens. ' 160
B. The Connection Between Academic Achievement and Student
Discipline
Policy makers have offered a number of solutions for narrowing the
achievement gap between American teenagers and their international
counterparts. They have thrown money at the problem: In 2004, for
example, the United States spent more than $8,000 per student at the
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). Id. at 6-7.
156. Achieve, supra note 6, at 5.
157. ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & DONNA M. DESROCHERS, EDUC. TESTING SERV., STANDARDS FOR
WHAT? THE ECONOMIC ROOTS OF K-16 REFORM 2-3 (2003), available at
http://www.transitionmathproject.org/assets/docs/resources/standards for what.pdf.
158. OECD, supra note 155, at 137.
159. Id. at 125.
160. Achieve, supra note 6, at 5.
elementary level and more than $10,000 per student at the secondary
level. 161 Only Luxembourg spent more at both levels. 162 Policy makers
have designed rigorous curricula and graduation requirements, asking that
all students complete a program that adequately prepares them for either
college or knowledge-based work. 163 And they have demanded more
from elementary educators, 164 believing that the best way to improve
high school achievement is to make younger kids smarter.165
But policymakers have often overlooked the connection between
student discipline and achievement at the high school level. On one
level, "school discipline can generate student compliance and peer
pressure toward academic performance."1 66  Conservative education
scholars, for example, have consistently argued that schools need the
authority to discipline students and maintain order in the classroom in
order to provide students with a quality education. 167 Others have argued
that private schools outperform public schools academically because
they maintain stricter disciplinary policies.1 68
Of course, the connection is not as clear-cut as some of those scholars
suggest. Discipline does not necessarily equate with higher achievement
in part because "discipline" is so ill-defined. For instance, some scholars
have suggested that using "strict disciplinary practices, such as corporal
punishment, could lead to lower educational achievement and higher
rates of delinquency."1 69  And, in fact, studies have shown that
authoritarian disciplinary practices often alienate students, weakening
their intellectual curiosity, deadening their interest in educational subject
matter, and suppressing their desire to learn.170 Recall the final scene of
Dead Poets Society, where students read dryly from a book of
nineteenth-century poetry after an authoritarian school official fired
161. OECD, supra note 155, at 173.
162. Id.
163. See Achieve, supra note 6, at 5 (describing the American Diploma Project, which 29 states have
pledged to implement).
164. See generally No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425.
165. See, e.g., Greene & Winters, supra note 150, at 10 ("[W]e cannot increase participation at four-
year colleges without addressing the problems of the K-12 education system.").
166. ARUM, supra note 10, at 32.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing JAMES SAMUEL COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PUBLIC & PRIVATE HIGH SCHOOLS
(1987)).
169. Id. at 33 (citing WAYNE WELSH, PATRICIA JENKINS, & JACK GREENE, CENTER FOR PUBLIC
POLICY, BUILDING A CULTURE AND CLIMATE OF SAFETY IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN PHILADELPHIA:
SCHOOL-BASED MANAGEMENT & VIOLENCE REDUCTION (1997)).
170. See id. at 32-33.
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their beloved teacher, seeming to care less about a subject that had
enthralled them. 171
In fact, students accept some form of discipline as necessary and will
often tolerate strict disciplinary policies, 172 but they will not accept
unfair disciplinary policies.1 73 Thus, education scholars have missed the
more important question in these cases: Whether school discipline,
regardless of its strictness, is effective. The effectiveness of discipline
often hinges on the degree to which students accept and internalize
school rules.174  Richard Arum's research, for example, shows that
students are most responsive when they perceive discipline as both "fair
and relatively strict."1 75  These students' schools succeeded "in
promoting educational achievement and youth socialization. Students...
were more likely to demonstrate commitment to the educational
process, and had better grades and higher test scores. They were also less
likely to assert that it was acceptable to disobey rules or to report being
arrested as adolescents. '1 76 On the other hand, students in overly strict
schools who considered disciplinary practices authoritarian, unfair, and
illegitimate "yielded negative consequences in certain areas: Students...
had lower grades, were more apt to report a willingness to disobey rules,
and [had] a higher incidence of arrests. 177
Even more disturbing, Arum's studies also show that variations in
discipline has a more profound effect on racial minorities, especially
African Americans.1 78 On the one hand, African Americans "were more
likely than white students to experience school settings that were either
the most lenient or the strictest-settings often perceived as unfair and
thus poorly designed for cognitive development." 1 79 In the schools that
171. DEAD POETS SOCIETY (Touchstone Pictures 1989).
172. See ARUM, supra note 10, at 31-32 ("As students reported increasing levels of the strictness of
school discipline, higher levels of fairness were also reported up to a certain point.").
173. See id. at 31. Arum's research shows that, "[a]s students reported increasing levels of the
strictness of school discipline, higher levels of fairness were also reported up to a certain point. When
students reported the highest levels of school strictness, however, they said that discipline was applied
less fairly than when school discipline was reported at a more moderate level of strictness. This
curvilinear association suggests that students believed that increased strictness was legitimate at
moderate levels; if discipline became too strict, however, it was often viewed as authoritarian and lost
some of its legitimacy." Id.
174. Id._at 33.
175. Id. at 34.
176. Id. at 34.
177. Id.
178. ARuM, supra note 10, at 179.
179. Id. at 180.
were considered lenient (but unfair), "African-American students
performed considerably worse than white students on their twelfth-grade
test even after considering their prior tenth-grade test performance and
other environmental factors." 180  It was "when students reported that
their schools were both strict and fair[] [that] there were no negative
effects of race" on academic performance. 181
Those findings pose significant hurdles for a country trying to shrink
the achievement gap that exists not only between American students
and their international counterparts abroad, but between racial groups at
home.1 82 In order to eliminate those trends, we need to understand why
school discipline is ineffective. The Supreme Court can answer that
question by looking in the mirror. As Arum explains, "discipline is often
ineffective-and at times actually counterproductive or detrimental to
students-because the schools' legitimacy and moral authority have been
eroded." 183  Court rulings that overturned school disciplinary decisions
have driven that erosion in authority.1 84
C. Tinker's Unintended Consequences: How the Student Speech Doctrine
Has Eroded the Legitimacy and Moral Authority of Schools
The Supreme Court stated sound law in Tinker. The Des Moines
school board's decision to punish a few good kids for passively
expressing themselves on the most important social issue of the day
seemed arbitrary and unjust-a view reinforced by the fact that the rule
the students violated was surreptitiously drawn up by high school
principals after they learned of the armband plan. 185 But the disruption
standard that the Tinker majority used to invalidate the suspensions sent
the wrong signals to students and lower courts. It seemed to say that
school officials could only prohibit speech (or expressive conduct) when
the speech would disrupt the educational process. And mere disruption
180. Id. at 180-81.
181. Id. at 181.
182. See, e.g., Harold Berlak, Race and the Achievement Gap, RETHINKING SCHOOLS, Summer 2001,
http://www.rethinkingschools.org/archive/15 04/Race154.shtml. ("That there is a race gap in
educational achievement is not news. Large numbers of the nation's children leave school, with and
without high school diplomas, barely able to read, write, and do simple math. But the failures of the
schools are not evenly distributed. They fall disproportionately on students of color.").
183. ARUM, supra note 10, at 181.
184. Id. at 4, 13 ("The reason that 'adversarial legalism' has been so costly with regard to school
discipline is that the legal challenges produced not only changes in organizational practices, but also
undermined the legitimacy of a school's moral authority more generally.").
185. See JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 6 (describing the meeting).
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was not enough: The speech had to materially and substantially disrupt
the educational process, an inherently vague standard that gave lower
courts a broad license to second-guess the judgment of school officials.
Those courts often decided on their own what constituted a material
and substantial disruption, without paying serious attention to what
school officials thought. No court showcased that flexibility more
zealously than the Ninth Circuit in Fraser. The Bethel School District
understood Tinker's message perfectly when it erected a policy that
prohibited conduct that "materially and substantially interferes with the
educational process... including the use of obscene, profane language or
gestures.1 186 Furthermore, it offered plenty of evidence to show that
Matthew Fraser's speech had actually disrupted the educational
process. 187 And, indeed, the Ninth Circuit agreed that Fraser's speech
evoked a "lively and noisy response from the students," including
"sexually suggestive movements."1 88 However, it disagreed with school
officials about the extent of the disruption, concluding that the level of
disruption was not material or substantial enough to justify Fraser's
punishment. For instance, the court determined that the school "had no
difficulty in maintaining order during the assembly," suggesting that
nothing short of bedlam would meet Tinker's disruption standard.1 89
The flexibility that Tinker gave lower courts to overturn school
discipline signaled to students that they should challenge their school
officials' decisions.1 90  The signal worked: While only seventy-two
school discipline cases reached the nation's appellate courts between
1960 and 1968, an average of seventy-six per year reached the appellate
courts in the six years following Tinker.191  The sheer cost of that
litigation, combined with the legal training that schools had to give
school officials to guard against imposing unconstitutional discipline,
chilled disciplinary responses to student misbehavior.1 92 So did the fact
186. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985).
187. Id. at 1360 (describing how some students hooted and hollered during Fraser's speech and how
one teacher spent ten minutes of class time the next day discussing Fraser's speech because that was
all her students wanted to talk about).
188. Id. at 1360.
189. See id. at 1360.
190. See ARuM, supra note 10, at 15 ("Successful legal challenges to school authority taught students
that school rules were indeed violatable.").
191. Id. at 18.
192. See id. at 84 ("Court challenges to school discipline imposed significant financial burdens on
school systems, both in terms of the cost of hiring lawyers and the time spent by school officials in
answering these challenges."). For example, in one recent student speech case, school officials were
52
that, by establishing a constitutional standard to measure school
disciplinary procedures, the Court opened up the possibility that school
officials would be held personally liable for the monetary damages that a
student suffered as a result of impermissible discipline. 193 Rather than
risk exposure to a damages award, school officials simply chose not to
discipline students. 194  That caused teachers to lose control of their
classrooms. 195 For example, one high school English teacher recounted
how she caught a student (the son of a neurosurgeon) cheating on his
exam, by holding an open book on his lap during the test. 196 By the
time the teacher made it to the student's desk, he had put the book back
so concerned about a potential lawsuit that, after removing a student from class for wearing an
inflammatory, anti-gay tee shirt, the school officials refused to suspend him, even though the student
repeatedly asked them to suspend him. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1173
(9th Cir. 2006) ("Harper was not suspended, no disciplinary record was placed in his file, and he
received full attendance credit for the day.").
193. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (holding "that a school board member is not
immune from liability for damages ... if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student
affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights or other injury to the student"). Naturally, school officials have qualified immunity to shield
them from such liability, so long as they do not violate clearly established law. E Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). But some lower courts have used the student speech doctrine to
reject qualified immunity claims. For example, the Ninth Circuit held Alaska principal Deborah Morse
personally liable for damages suffered by Joseph Frederick when she suspended him for refusing to
take down his "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banner. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006).
The Ninth Circuit panel reasoned that Morse had studied an "advanced school law course" that
discussed Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhhneier, the third case in the Supreme
Court's student speech trilogy, and therefore determined that she violated Frederick's clearly
established constitutional rights. Id. at 1124-25 (additional quotation marks omitted). Of course, the
court misjudged the fact that, while Morse may have known that she could not punish Frederick for
exercising his speech rights absent special justification (be it actual or threatened disruption, school
sponsorship, or the speech's lewd nature), it was almost impossible for a reasonable person to know
that she violated a clearly established right when the student speech doctrine involves such nuanced
and complicated factual determinations. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2007)
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (explaining how, "unlike the
Ninth Circuit, other courts have described the tests these cases suggest as complex and often difficult
to apply," which suggested that the law Morse purportedly violated was not clearly established); cf
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (stating that qualified immunity "provides [ ] protection to
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law"). The court's error may have
resulted from the fact that it thought the case was easy to decide. See Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1124-25
(denying qualified immunity to Morse because "[t]he law of Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, Burch, and
McMinnville is so clear and well-settled that no reasonable government official could have believed
the censorship and punishment of Frederick's speech to be lawful. In fact, there is nothing in the
authorities that justifies what the school did, and no reasonable official could conclude otherwise"
(footnote omitted)). Whatever the reason, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the qualified
immunity issue when it decided the case because it found no constitutional violation in the first place.
194. See ARUM, supra note 10, at 13.
195. Id. at 149-51.
196. Id. at 151.
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onto the floor. 197 She sent the student to the principal's office but the
principal, concerned about a potential lawsuit, summoned the teacher
instead and asked for documentary proof that the student had cheated
before the school took any action. 198 In another case, Jeffrey Gerstel, a
special-education teacher in New York City, pulled a student out of his
classroom after the student threatened to kill an assistant teacher.1 99 As
he was doing so, the boy collided with a bookcase and cut himself.200
Gerstel was summoned by the school to a hearing, where the student's
mother announced her intention to sue the school district. 201  The
mother eventually settled her claim with the school out of court, but
other damage had been done. 202 The student went back into Gerstel's
classroom and tormented the teacher for the rest of the year: Anytime
Gerstel tried to assert control over his classroom, the students would
taunt him with chants of, "I'm going to get my mother up here and
bring you up on charges. 20 3
Those may have been foreseeable consequences. After all, we
typically prefer to overprotect speech rights and chill the government
from punishing other speakers than underprotect the rights and chill
people from speaking204 and we accept that placing the burden on the
government will have financial and administrative costs. But the Tinker
majority did not foresee the effect its disruption standard would have on
school discipline generally. As noted earlier, the effectiveness of school
discipline often turns on the degree to which students accept the
legitimacy of school rules and the moral authority of school leaders. 205
Tinker's vague and malleable standard, which made judges, not school
officials, the ultimate arbiters of proper discipline, undermined that
legitimacy and moral authority. 206  The variation in decisions that
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See Kay S. Hymowitz, Who Killed School Discipline?, City Journal (Spring 2000), available at
http://www.city-journal.org/hml/10 2 who killed-school-dis.hml.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. For example, the Supreme Court has relaxed its discretionary rule that a party cannot invoke the
constitutional rights of third parties in the First Amendment context, allowing an individual whose own
conduct is not constitutionally protected to challenge a state policy as facially invalid. As one
professor argues, this policy seems to reflect "[t]he special status of First Amendment claims." See
Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 282-83 (1984).
205. ARUM, supra note 10, at 33.
206. Id. at 4.
Tinker engendered also made it more difficult for schools to implement
new disciplinary policies. 207  But schools could not abandon their
disciplinary policies altogether so, in an attempt to guard against student
lawsuits, they reduced the use of extreme punishments like expulsion and
instead disciplined students extensively with short-term suspensions. 20 8
That might have seemed great to students who frequently misbehaved or
behaved so poorly that they would have been threatened with expulsion
in earlier years, but it made school discipline seem less fair, more
arbitrary, and unjust. 20 9 Students did not internalize or respect school
rules and, as a result, discipline was ineffective-even when it was
justified.210
The Tinker majority did not intend those consequences. Indeed, the
disruption standard that so many courts have culled from Tinker was not
even necessary to decide the case. The Des Moines School Board did
not violate the Constitution because it could not demonstrate disruption:
It violated the Constitution because it favored one expression over
another. 211 Its policy only prohibited the wearing of black armbands, a
particular symbol that students wore to school to express their
disagreement with the Vietnam War.212  The Des Moines schools
allowed students to wear other expressive symbols, including political
campaign buttons and even the Nazi Iron Cross.213 They apparently had
no problem with student expression that promoted American
involvement in the Vietnam War. 21 4 Christopher Eckhardt recalled that
207. Id. Although Tinker enabled courts to routinely second-guess the discipline decisions made by
school administrators, the student speech doctrine's flexibility posed more basic problems. As Arum
notes, not all school discipline lawsuits favored students. Rather, "U.S. court decisions have varied
over time and across jurisdictions ... some have tended to favor students, some school authorities."
Id. According to Arum's research, the chance that a student would win a school discipline case
peaked at 49 percent in the mid- to late 1960s. Id. at 88. The likelihood of student success has
dropped since then, hovering in the 35 to 40 percent range since the early 1980s. Id. But the mere
"variation in the direction of court decisions was partly responsible for the difficulties schools
encountered when they attempted to implement disciplinary practices that fostered both learning and
effective socialization." Id. at 4.
208. Id. at 13.
209. Id. at 31, 33 ("[W]hen courts were supportive of student rights, students reported that school
discipline was both less strict and less fair: that is, schools were less likely to apply discipline and the
limited discipline they did apply was considered even less legitimate than elsewhere.").
210. See id. at 33 ("For discipline to be effective, students must actually internalize school rules. This
internalization occurs much more readily when school discipline is equated with the legitimately
exercised moral authority of school personnel.").
211. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-11.
212. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-11.
213. Id. at 510.
214. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 7-8 (emphasis added).
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the gym teachers and coaches at Roosevelt High School encouraged
students to chant "Beat the Vietcong" during their calisthenics exercises
after news broke of the armband plan. 215
As Justice Fortas recognized, that inconsistent treatment of messages
represented a classic form of viewpoint discrimination, 216 which the
First Amendment has always prohibited, regardless of context.217 The
difference in treatment was especially inappropriate in the public school
setting, since states did not develop public schools to "foster a
homogenous people"21 8 or to be "enclaves of totalitarianism," where
school officials have total control over their students and transform
them into "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses
to communicate. '21 9  Then disruption came in. Justice Fortas wrote
that, "[i]n order for... school officials to justify prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint. '220 In other words, a school could curtail a particular message
when it could reasonably forecast that the speech "would materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school. '221 But Justice Fortas did not believe that
disruption was the only interest that could justify discipline that
restricted speech. Why? Because his opinion explicitly did not address
"regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, [ ] hair style,
or deportment," all of which the Tinker majority suggested a school
could regulate consistent with the First Amendment, regardless of
whether the regulated conduct "disrupted" school activities. 222 The fact
215. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 7-8 (emphasis added). One of the coaches later said that this chant
sprang from the students themselves but that the coaches decided not to stop the chant because the
students were "proving their Americanism." Id. at 8 (additional quotation marks omitted).
216. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-11 ("[A] particular symbol-black armbands worn to exhibit
opposition to this Nation's involvement in Vietnam-was singled out for prohibition. Clearly, the
prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to
avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally
permissible." (emphases added)).
217. See, e.g., Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 804 (1984) ("[T]he First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that
favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.").
218. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
219. Id. at511.
220. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
221. See id. (additional quotation marks omitted).
222. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507-08 (citing Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.
1968)). In Ferrell, three students were denied admission into their high school because they wore
56
that Justice Fortas considered clothing regulations to be distinct from the
regulation at issue in Tinker indicates that the Tinker majority did not
intend to limit a school's ability to discipline its students to situations
where the student's conduct disrupted the educational process. It simply
identified disruption as one interest that would justify schools in
punishing students for conduct that included constitutionally protected
speech.
D. In Loco Parentis Revived: Recognizing the Ability of School Officials
to Discipline Students in a Content-Neutral Manner
The in loco parentis standard would prohibit school officials from
discriminating against speakers or imposing content-based restrictions
on student speech, unless they could show that the particular speech at
issue would materially and substantially disrupt the educational process.
Thus, the standard would be consistent with Tinker and the rest of the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence: a school could not
arbitrarily decide to prohibit one type of speech, or one particular
message, without showing a compelling justification for that
discriminatory action, such as a substantial disruption of the educational
process. 223
Of course, school officials would have to respect other basic
Beatles-style mop tops, which they insisted were necessary to operate their band, "Sounds Unlimited."
Ferrell, 392 F.2d at 698-99 & nn.1-2. In fact, the students' contract with their band manager required
that they "maintain their dress and personnal rsic. appearance in conformity with accepted
STANDARDS and CUSTOMS OF ROCK & ROLL GROUPS, COMBO'S & BANDS including so
called BEATLE TYPE HAIR STYLE." Id. at 698 n.2 (capitalization in original). And the Fifth
Circuit assumed that the students' wearing of the hair style was constitutionally protected expression.
Id. at 702. Although the school's principal recited previous incidents involving students who wore
Beatles-style hair cuts, including "one occasion [where] a group of boys in his school had decided that
a classmate's hair was too long and that they were going to take the matter in their own hands and trim
it themselves." Id. at 700-01. The Fifth Circuit upheld the school's actions because it did not consider
them arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory. Id. at 702. The element of disruption, although it may
have been relevant to the Court's determination that the principal had not acted unreasonably, was not
required for the school to punish the students. See Id. In fact, a skeptical court like the Ninth Circuit's
Fraser panel would probably have viewed the "disruptions" cited by the school principal in Ferrell as
unpersuasive.
223. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (reading the First
Amendment "to permit reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted
circumstances"); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 n.31 (2000) ("It is, of course, no answer
to assert that the [law] does not discriminate on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint, but only on the
basis of the subject matter of his message. 'The First Amendments hostility to content-based
regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public
discussion of an entire topic."' (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n.6 (1980) (additional
quotation marks omitted)).
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constitutional rights as well, which would protect students against
blatantly unconstitutional discipline. For example, they could not
suspend or expel students from school without giving them notice of the
charges and an opportunity to respond to them. 224 But otherwise, the in
loco parentis standard would give school officials broad authority to
discipline students. They would have the authority to draw up
disciplinary rules and, so long as the rules did not discriminate on the
basis of content or viewpoint, courts would review them the way they
review other government action that does not substantially burden
constitutional rights, by measuring whether the school board had a
reasonable basis for developing the rule. 225
Simply giving officials that authority, and removing the cloud of
judicial activism that currently hovers over school discipline, would have
a profound effect in the school setting.226 Truly deferring to school
officials in designing disciplinary policies and making disciplinary
decisions would restore the moral authority that school boards lost in the
student speech revolution. It would send a signal to students that, except
in the rare cases like Tinker where a school has arbitrarily singled out a
particular opinion for punishment, the courts are an inappropriate place
to challenge school disciplinary policies. And by removing the threat of
a lawsuit from every discipline decision that is made, the in loco parentis
224. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (extending minimum due process protections,
including notice and an opportunity to be heard, to students facing even minor suspensions).
225. In a way, the in loco parentis standard is a twist on the time, place, and manner analysis that the
Supreme Court traditionally uses to review content-neutral regulations that restrict speech in a
particular public setting. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 (1994)
(reiterating that the Court reviews content-neutral regulations that govern conduct in a traditional
public forum to determine "whether the time, place, and manner regulations were narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest." (additional quotation marks omitted)). I based the model on
this test because regulations in the school setting, by their nature, only affect speech in a particular
setting and leave open many alternative channels of communication-a point I will return to in Part IV
of this Article. Given how deferentially the Court typically applies the time, place, and manner test, I
assume that it would probably recognize any non-discriminatory educational interest as significant
enough to meet the test. See Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content
Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1368 (2006)
("[B]oth the 'time, place, or manner' and 'content-neutral' labels have essentially become terms of
art to express a conclusion by the Court that a given regulation will be subjected to a fairly deferential
level of scrutiny."). Thus, the in loco parentis model would merely measure whether the disciplinary
policy was so patently unreasonable that the Court had no reason to defer to the school officials'
judgment in developing it. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799-800 (1989) ("[T]he
requirement of narrow tailoring [in the time, place, and manner analysis] is satisfied so long as the ...
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent
the regulation" and "[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to
achieve the governments interest." (omission in original) (additional quotation marks omitted)).
226. ARUM, supra 10, at 185-87.
standard would allow school officials to discipline students more fairly.
They could deal with serious infractions-or students who violate
multiple school rules-more seriously, without the fear that a court will
step in and decide for itself what amount of punishment is
appropriate. 227 That matters because, as Richard Arum's research has
shown, the effectiveness of school discipline depends on its legitimacy,
and the extent to which students accept the discipline as fair. 228
The in loco parentis standard also recognizes that school boards,
especially those in urban areas where the achievement gap is widest,229
have a legitimate interest in using discipline as a policy tool to promote
safe schools. Indeed, studies have shown that stricter disciplinary
policies help combat the threat of school violence and help prevent
students from falling into criminal behavior. 230 For example, in one
study, "stricter discipline led dramatically to reduced rates of individual
arrest... the probability of individual arrest decreas[ing] from six percent
to two percent as perceptions of school strictness increased. '231  But
those results did not just depend on the strictness of the policies
themselves; rather, they hinged on a combination of the strictness of
the policy and the degree to which students accepted the policy as fair.
Thus, "when discipline was considered unfair, stricter discipline was
227. For instance, under the current student discipline doctrine, the Eighth Circuit held that school
officials violated the "substantive due process" rights of two students when they suspended them for
three months for spiking the punch at a school activity with two 12-ounce bottles of malt liquor.
Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1973). The court apparently thought that the
school board's decision to suspend the girls was unreasonable because it made no finding regarding
the alcoholic content of the spiked punch: it read the school's policies to only prohibit "intoxicating
liquors," not all alcoholic beverages and the court interpreted Arkansas state law to define an
"intoxicating liquor" as a drink that has an alcohol content exceeding 3.2 or 5 percent of its overall
weight. Id. at 190. The spiked punch would have failed that test because it only contained 24-ounces
of malt liquor, and 60-ounces of a soft drink, and enough water to concoct one and a half gallons of
punch. Id. at 187. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the school
policy, saying the court was "ill advised to supplant the interpretation of the regulation of those
officers who adopted it and are entrusted with its enforcement." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
324-25 (1975). The Court unanimously vacated that portion of the Eighth Circuit's decision. See id. at
327 (Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., and Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228. ARUM, supra note 10, at 33.
229. See generally KATHLEEN PORTER & STEPHANIE SOPER, NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR
COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM, CLOSING THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP: URBAN SCHOOLS 1 (2003), available
at http://www.centerforcsri.org/pubs/annual/csrconsum03 closing.pdf (arguing that the problem at the
root of the American education "crisis" is the achievement gap in urban schools that serve a majority
of low-income and minority students).
230. See ARuM, supra note 10, at 34, 183, 185 ("School disciplinary climates, while important for all
students, were likely to be of greatest significance to youth at risk for delinquency and
incarceration.").
231. See id. at 185.
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actually associated with higher rates of fighting. '232 Additionally, "[i]n
schools that were perceived as least fair, student perceptions of
strictness had less significant effects" on the arrest rate. 233
Tinker's objective disruption standard undermined that fairness,
hindering the ability of schools to use aggressive student discipline to
make urban schools safer. The in loco parentis standard corrects that
mistake and elevates the importance of keeping schools safe in the
constitutional analysis of school discipline.
IV. THE IN LOCO PARENTIS MODEL OF MEASURING STUDENT DISCIPLINE
ADEQUATELY PROTECTS SPEECH RIGHTS
The main concern with adopting a deferential in loco parentis
standard to govern student discipline cases is the fear that the standard
will chill the expression of certain messages, especially opinions with
which the government disagrees. 234 But we should be less worried about
overprotecting the right to speak in the school setting. For one, when
the government (acting through local school boards) regulates student
speech, it acts as an educator, not as the sovereign. Its conduct has
virtually no impact outside the school environment, rendering any
"chill" on free expression minimal. More importantly, the in loco
parentis standard protects against the most serious threat to free
expression by prohibiting schools from discriminating against students
on the basis of their viewpoint. In that way, the in loco parentis
standard would ensure that schools do not become "enclaves of
totalitarianism," tools for government officials to use to indoctrinate
students with the government's preferred message. 235
232. Id. at 183.
233. Id. at 185.
234. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637 (2007) (Alito and Kennedy, JJ., concurring)
(rejecting the Petitioners' argument that school officials should have broad authority to regulate
student speech that interferes with the school's "educational mission" because "some public schools
have defined their educational missions as including the inculcation of whatever political and social
views are held by the members of these groups").
235. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
A. The Government as Educator, Not Sovereign: Why We Should Not
Be So Skeptical of Limiting Constitutional Rights in the School
Setting
One of the flaws that has driven criticism of the in loco parentis
doctrine is the assumption that, when the government regulates conduct
inside the school setting, it acts with the same type of authority that it
acts with when it regulates conduct as the sovereign.23 6 Indeed, several
members of the current Supreme Court appear to suffer from this
assumption. They have gone so far as to compare government
regulation of student conduct to government regulation of political
campaigning, saying that, just as when the government announces what
organizations can and cannot say about political candidates, "when the
'First Amendment is implicated [in the school setting], the tie goes to
the speaker,"' not to the censor. 237
But, as then-Justice Rehnquist once noted, "the government may act
in other capacities than as sovereign, and when it does the First
Amendment may speak with a different voice. '238 For example, the
Supreme Court has long recognized that the government has discretion
to limit speech that occurs on certain government property, because
when it does so it acts more as a property owner than as a sovereign. 239
Similarly, the Court has said that the government can place more
serious restrictions on its employees' speech than it can on non-
employees' speech because the government, acting as employer, "has
interests.., that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection
with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. '240  Most
236. See, e.g, Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Public schools are
instrumentalities of government, and government is not entitled to suppress speech that undermines
whatever missions it defines for itself.").
237. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2649 (2007) (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, JJ.,
dissenting) (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2007)).
238. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 908 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
239. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) ("The State, no less than a private owner of
property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated.").
240. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In the government employment context,
the Court has said that the First Amendment protects a government employee's right to engage in
speech on matters of public concern so long as the speech does not interfere with the employee's job.
See id. at 572-73 (concluding, in that case, that a school could not fire a teacher for speaking when
the teacher's speech did not impede his performance or interfere with the general operations of the
school). However, "where a government employee speaks 'as an employee upon matters only of
personal interest,' the First Amendment does not offer protection." Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct.
61
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notably, the government-employer has an interest "in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. '241
In deference to that non-sovereign interest, the Court eschews strict
scrutiny and balances the government's interest against the employee's
interest in speaking out on matters of public concern.242 Employee
speech that does not touch on a matter of public concern receives no
First Amendment protection. 243 But the Court does not worry that the
government-employer will chill expression in the citizenry at large
because it recognizes that the regulation of government employees has
virtually no impact outside the public employment context. 244
The same is true when the government acts as educator. School rules
do not apply to the public in general; they only affect the conduct of
certain individuals (most of them minors, no less). Indeed, school rules
seem even less restrictive than rules that govern the conduct of
government employees, since they only apply in certain locations and
at certain times of the day. 24  Even school officials themselves
recognize that, once a student steps outside the school grounds, she is
outside the school's jurisdiction and cannot be punished for violating
"school" rules. 246 Additionally, the government's interests in educating
1951, 1973 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
241. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
242. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
243. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444-45 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[W]here a
government employee speaks 'as an employee upon matters only of personal interest,' the First
Amendment does not offer protection." (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983))).
244. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 ("We in no sense suggest that speech on private matters falls into
one of the narrow and well-defined classes of expression which carries so little social value, such as
obscenity, that the State can prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction. For
example, an employee's false criticism of his employer on grounds not of public concern may be cause
for his discharge but would be entitled to the same protection in a libel action accorded an identical
statement made by a man on the street." (citations omitted)).
245. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044-45 (2d Cir.
1979) ("[O]ur willingness to defer to the schoolmaster's expertise in administering school discipline
rests, in large measure, upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach beyond the
schoolhouse gate. When an educator seeks to extend his dominion beyond these bounds, therefore, he
must answer to the same constitutional commands that bind all other institutions of government.").
246. E.g., MICHAEL IMBER & TYLL VAN GEEL, A TEACHER'S GUIDE TO EDUCATION LAW 67-68 (3d
ed. 2005). Of course, this is an overly simplistic statement. Many courts have recognized that a
school's jurisdiction extends off-campus during school hours, or at least during school-sanctioned
events. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007) (rejecting Frederick's argument
that his off-campus activity should not even have been subject to the Court's student speech doctrine
because "[t]he event occurred during normal school hours ... was sanctioned by Principal Morse 'as
an approved social event or class trip,' and the school district's rules expressly provide that pupils in
,approved social events and class trips are subject to district rules for student conduct"' (citations
omitted)). Some have even said a school can discipline a student for activity that occurred solely
outside of school, and during non-school hours, if the student's off-campus activity had a "sufficient
62
our children differ from its interests in regulating the conduct of the
general public: Most importantly, it has primary responsibility for
preparing American children to compete for the more sophisticated jobs
that will dominate the New Economy. The federal government
considers that interest so important that it has conditioned federal
funding to states on their development of rigorous curriculum and
academic standards. 247 Surely that interest justifies the deference that
the in loco parentis standard would show to school officials in making
disciplinary decisions.
What seems to scare critics of the deferential in loco parentis
standard more than the deferential Pickering standard is the fear that
schools will use the doctrine to create those "enclaves of
totalitarianism" that Tinker envisioned, tools the state can use in an
Orwellian fashion to indoctrinate the future electorate with its officially-
approved messages.248 Those fears, while legitimate, are largely built on
a different concern: The idea that a state can compel its students to
adopt a certain message or force children to accept the state's preferred
method of instruction.2 49 They ignore the fact that, while standards like
Pickering balancing or in loco parentis show more deference to state
officials than some constitutional doctrines, they do not give the
government unlimited authority to control speech.
nexus" to the school environment-such as "where speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its
personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator." See J.S. v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864-65 (Pa. 2002).
247. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, 1457 ("If a State
fails to meet the deadlines established by the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 (or under any
waiver granted by the Secretary or under any compliance agreement with the Secretary) for
demonstrating that the State has in place challenging academic content standards and student
achievement standards, and a system for measuring and monitoring adequate yearly progress, the
Secretary shall withhold 25 percent of the funds that would otherwise be available to the State for
State administration and activities under this part in each year until the Secretary determines that the
State meets those requirements.").
248. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
249. See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943) (holding a state cannot
force its public school students to participate in the American flag salute because such an order
involves the type of "involuntary affirmation," or compelled speech, that is considered even more
offensive to the First Amendment than laws that regulate speech).
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B. Tinkering With Pickering: The In Loco Parentis Standard, While
Properly Deferring to the Judgment of School Officials, Protects
Against the Most Serious First Amendment Infringements
A deferential standard like in loco parentis does not need to give
unfettered discretion to school officials to be effective-nor should it.
Although the government has different interests when it acts as educator
rather than as sovereign, its behavior can still violate students' First
Amendment rights. The in loco parentis standard would protect against
those violations.
For example, the First Amendment broadly prohibits the government
from forcing individuals to affirm or adopt a message with which they
disagree. 250  The general reasoning behind such restrictions on
"compelled" speech is our view that "[t]he right to speak and the right
to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader
concept of 'individual freedom of mind,"' which is the heart of the First
Amendment. 251  But our practical fears about compelled speech run
much deeper. Compelled speech threatens core principles at the root of
the First Amendment, as exemplified by the phenomenon of cognitive
dissonance, "a psychological process whereby an individual who has been
forced to express a view contrary to her own eventually rationalizes her
actions by subconsciously adopting the positions she has been forced to
express. '252  That harm "interferes with the autonomy of the
individual's mental processes" and "therefore breaches the wall between
government and the mentally autonomous private individual-a central
tenet of a healthy democratic system of government. '253
Those concerns exist both when the government acts as the sovereign
and when it acts as an educator. Indeed, we might have more reason to
be concerned about the government's act of compelling students to
affirm a particular message inside the classroom. Children spend a
significant amount of time in school-particularly before their teenage
years, when they are especially impressionable and vulnerable to
250. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("[T]he right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all.").
251. Id. (quoting West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (Murphy, J.,
concurring)).
252. See Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment
Theory: Redistributive Values & the Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1114 (1999)
(describing cognitive dissonance as one of four particular harms associated with compelled speech).
253. See id.
government brainwashing. 25 4 For these reasons, the Supreme Court has
consistently prohibited the government from compelling students to
support a particular message, even if that message is a show of
patriotism during a time of war.255 As Justice Jackson noted, "[i]f there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein. 256
The same dangers result when the government, rather than forcing
students to affirm a particular belief, promotes one viewpoint over
another in the school setting. When school officials discipline students
because of their viewpoint, they effectively compel students to adopt
the school's favored message. This understanding drove the Court's
opinion in Tinker and was reflected when the Court stated: "students
may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate" or "confined to the expression of those
sentiments that are officially approved. '257  Furthermore, "'[t]he
classroom is particularly the 'marketplace of ideas,"' and, in order to
develop the type of citizens that we want to lead America in the future,
we want our education system to promote "'wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,
(rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.' ' '258
Viewpoint discrimination destroys that wide exposure.
The in loco parentis standard would protect against those harms by
subjecting educational policies that compel students to affirm a
particular belief to strict scrutiny. It would also strictly scrutinize any
disciplinary policy that discriminates among viewpoints or speakers on
254. See Sandra L. Hofferth & John F. Sandberg, How American Children Spend Their Time, 63 J. OF
MARRIAGE & FAMILY 295,300 (May 2001) (indicating that children under age 13 spend an average of
21 hours per week in school, with another four-plus hours in day care services).
255. See West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (striking down a
compulsory flag salute in the West Virginia public schools); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
81 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has traditionally viewed government
promotion of religion more skeptically when the government acts as educator in the school
environment because "when government-sponsored religious exercises are directed at impressionable
children who are required to attend school,... [the] government endorsement is much more likely to
result in coerced religious beliefs"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down a
Nebraska law that prohibited educators from teaching their students in any language except English).
256. West Va. Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S at 642.
257. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
258. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (additional citations
omitted) (alteration in original).
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the basis of the message those speakers convey-a standard the Tinker
Court could have easily used to strike down the Des Moines schools' ban
on black armbands. To further protect student speech interests, the
standard would allow for as-applied challenges, so that school officials do
not draft facially neutral disciplinary policies but apply them in a way
that discriminates among viewpoints. 2 9 It better serves the legitimate
interests that the government has in educating public schoolchildren
than the current student speech doctrine, which invites judges to make
disciplinary decisions that school officials are better trained to make.
C. What School Officials Can Learn from Morse in Arguing for an In
Loco Parentis Standard to Govern All Student Discipline Cases
Of course, the Supreme Court would have to accept the in loco
parentis standard and extend it to school discipline cases itself, which
might seem unlikely given the hostility that several of the Court's
current members have shown to the in loco parentis concept. 260 But at
least three justices appear comfortable with such a standard, 261 and two
of the justices who appear most hostile to the in loco parentis standard,
Justices Kennedy and Alito, could be swayed by redefining the in loco
parentis doctrine in terms of the government's special interest in acting
as educator, rather than in terms of parental delegation. Indeed, that
was how the attorneys that represented principal Deborah Morse in
259. See, e.g., The Tool Box v. Ogden City Corp., 355 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that a
First Amendment claim can be brought when an individual alleges "that a 'licensor' has applied a
facially neutral law to deny protected expression").
260. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2637-68 (Alito and Kennedy, JJ., concurring in the
judgment) ("When public school authorities regulate student speech, they act as agents of the State;
they do not stand in the shoes of the students' parents. It is a dangerous fiction to pretend that parents
simply delegate their authority-including their authority to determine what their children may say and
hear-to public school authorities. It is even more dangerous to assume that such a delegation of
authority somehow strips public school authorities of their status as agents of the State. Most parents,
realistically, have no choice but to send their children to a public school and little ability to influence
what occurs in the school. It is therefore wrong to treat public school officials, for purposes relevant
to the First Amendment, as if they were private, nongovernmental actors standing in locoparentis.").
261. Id. at 2621 (noting that there are three justices, Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who provided the strongest votes for reversing the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Morse. In fact, Justice Thomas seems most willing to adopt a modem in loco
parentis standard. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I am afraid
that our jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in schools except when they don't-
a standard continuously developed through litigation against local schools and their administrators. In
my view, petitioners could prevail for a much simpler reason: As originally understood, the
Constitution does not afford students a right to free speech in public schools.").
Morse v. Frederick262 won their case in the Supreme Court in 2007.
Morse arose during the Olympic torch's journey to the 2002 Winter
Olympics in Salt Lake City. 263 As the torch made its way through
Juneau, Alaska, officials at Juneau-Douglas High School let students out
of class to watch the torch pass their high school. 264 Students lined the
sidewalk on the school side of the street, as well as the sidewalk across
the street from the school. 265 Joseph Frederick, a seventeen-year old
senior who had failed to show up for his first classes of the morning,
nonetheless showed up to watch the torch relay. 266 He brought a large
banner with him and, as the torch passed by, followed by television
cameras, Frederick and his friends unfurled the banner. 267  It read:
"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS. '268
Morse, the school's principal, confronted Frederick and told him to
take the banner down. 269 Morse believed that the banner violated a
school policy prohibiting the display of offensive material, including
material that advertised or promoted drug use. 270  When Frederick
refused, she grabbed the banner from him and suspended him from school
for ten days. 27 1 Frederick eventually challenged his suspension in court
and, although a district court in Alaska granted summary judgment in
favor of the school district, 27 2 a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed. 273  The Ninth Circuit refused to analyze the case
under Fraser because it interpreted Fraser narrowly as a decision that
hinged on the sexual content of the speech and its delivery in a school
assembly. 274 Thus, it simply applied Tinker's disruption standard and,
because the school had offered no evidence to show that Frederick's
banner would have disrupted the educational process, it struck down the
262. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
263. See Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1116.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1116-17.
273. Id. at 1118.
274. See id. at 1119 ("Our case differs from Fraser in that Frederick's speech was not sexual (sexual
speech can be expected to stimulate disorder among those new to adult hormones), and did not disrupt
a school assembly.").
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suspension as unconstitutional. 275  It also refused to grant Morse
qualified immunity for her actions, making her personally liable for
Frederick's monetary damages. 276
The Supreme Court re-listed Morse four times before granting
certiorari in the case, suggesting that it considered summarily reversing
the Ninth Circuit on qualified immunity grounds. 277 But when the case
reached arguments on the merits, Morse's attorneys (led by former
Solicitor General and D.C. Circuit Judge Kenneth Starr) made a critical
decision: Rather than try to justify Morse's actions under Tinker's
disruption standard, they argued that the school was justified in
prohibiting messages that it reasonably believed promoted illegal drug
use. 278 Without saying so, that argument echoed the in loco parentis
rationale of cases like Fraser and Vernonia and focused the Court's
attention on the important non-sovereign interests the government has
in educating American children, interests that were largely glossed over
by lower courts that mechanically applied Tinker's disruption standard.
The strategy worked. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 27 9 and, in
doing so, it applied neither Tinker's disruption standard nor Fraser's
"offensiveness" standard. True, it interpreted Fraser to refine the
"'special characteristics of the school environment"' that allow schools
275. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1123. Indeed, in the Ninth Circuit, the school and principal Morse did not
even argue that Frederick's punishment was justified under Tinker: They "conceded that the speech.
. was censored only because it conflicted with the school's 'mission' of discouraging drug use." Id.;
see also Brief of Appellees at 47-48, Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 03-
35701) (arguing that the disruptiveness of Frederick's actions was "immaterial" because "[u]nder
Fraser a showing of disruption is not required").
276. Id. at 1124-25.
277. Supreme Court observers widely believe that the Court re-listed the case four times because it
considered summarily reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision to deny qualified immunity to Morse,
making the principal personally liable for any damages that Frederick suffered. E.g., Murad Hussain,
The "Bong" Show: Viewing Frederick's Publicity Stunt Through Kuhlmeier's Lens, 116 Yale L.J.
Pocket Part 292, 293 (2007), available at http://thepocketpart.org/2007/3/9/hussain.htmnl.
278. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-5, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278) (arguing that
"Tinker articulated a rule that allows the school boards considerable discretion both in identifying the
educational mission and to prevent disruption of that mission," which included deterring illegal drug
use). Of course, Morse's attorneys may have used this argument as much out of necessity as for
strategic reasons: One student described the scene outside the Juneau high school as "chaos," with
students getting into fights and throwing snowballs and plastic soda bottles as they awaited the arrival
of the Olympic torch. Brief for Respondents at 2-3, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278). Frederick
and his companions, by contrast, were "calm and orderly," a characterization that Morse did not
dispute. Id. at 3. Thus, Morse would have had a difficult time convincing the Court that Frederick's
actions physically disrupted the educational process in any way. See id. (emphasis added).
279. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
to more closely regulate student speech. 2 0 But when the Court said that
the government's interest in stopping student drug use combined with
the "special characteristics of the school environment" to justify
Principal Morse's actions because she could have reasonably believed
that his speech promoted illegal drug use,281 it stepped outside the
student speech doctrine and echoed the reasoning of cases like Pickering,
where the Court balanced individual rights against interests that the
government had in acting in its non-sovereign capacity. 282 And it went
even further than the TL.O. and Vernonia Courts did. The connection
between drug use and the rules applied in those cases was much tighter.
Both cases involved students suspected of possessing or selling drugs at
school. Neither implicated First Amendment rights of expression-a
point that was not lost on the Morse dissenters, who viewed Frederick's
banner as utter nonsense. 283
But Morse's attorneys convinced the Court that schools deserve more
deference when combating drug use by their students, and they got a
majority of the Court to eat right out of their hand. Even Justices
Kennedy and Alito, who are by most accounts the Court's strongest
supporters of First Amendment liberties,2 8 4  said that "[s]peech
advocating illegal drug use poses a threat to student safety that is just as
serious, if not always as immediately obvious" as the threat of violence
in school hallways. 285  Lest we forget that, although Justice Alito
280. See id. at 2626-27 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
281. Id. at 2628-29, 2638 (Alito and Kennedy, JJ., concurring) ("[A]ny argument for altering the
usual free speech rules in the public schools cannot rest on a theory of delegation but must instead be
based on some special characteristic of the school setting."). Although Justices Alito and Kennedy did
not mention other "special characteristics," they did not seem to think that this was the only one that
would justify altering the student speech analysis. See id. ("The special characteristic that is relevant
in this case is the threat to the physical safety of students." (emphasis added)).
282. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968) (reiterating that government
employers can discipline their employees for statements that impede the employee's proper
performance of her daily duties).
283. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2646 (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, JJ., dissenting) (noting that "the
relationship between schools and students 'is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision
and control that could not be exercised over free adults"' (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)).
284. See Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2002 (2002)
(unpublished update of Professor Volokh's 2000 article, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases,
48 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1193 (2000), on file with the author), available at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/howvoted.htm (noting that, since Justice Breyer joined the Court in
1994, Justice Kennedy has voted with the speaker in free speech cases seventy-five percent of the
time, while the other five active justices' records were more mixed, supporting the speaker only fifty
to sixty percent of the time).
285. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito and Kennedy, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
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described such deference "as standing at the far reaches of what the First
Amendment permits," 286 that reasoning allowed the Court to sidestep
some of the difficult issues that Morse presented, including the fact that
many people who saw Frederick's banner interpreted it as nonsense, a
catchy phrase designed to attract television cameras rather than to
promote illegal drug use.287  Furthermore, Frederick's demonstration
took place on the sidewalk across the street from the school, during a
public event that the school allowed its students to attend: It was not the
type of on-campus speech that the Court had traditionally allowed
schools to regulate under its student speech doctrine. 28
For that reason, Justices Alito and Kennedy should reconsider their
opposition to an in loco parentis standard when it gives significant
deference to school officials in disciplining students, so long as they do
not discriminate according to viewpoints. The standard might even win
over Justice Breyer, often recognized as the quintessential First
Amendment pragmatist. 28 9 It was Justice Breyer, after all, who suggested
that, when a law restricts the freedom of the press in order to protect
another constitutional right, the Constitution merely "demands
legislative efforts to tailor the laws in order reasonably to reconcile
media freedom with [the competing right]." 290 But the in loco parentis
standard has to be introduced as one that derives from the government's
interests in acting as educator, and its desire to improve the quality of
education that American children receive in our public schools, rather
than on the antiquated notion that parents delegate their parental
decision-making to school officials when their children step through the
286. Id.
287. See id. at 2643-2644 (Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); see also Frederick v. Morse,
439 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Frederick says that the words were just nonsense meant to
attract television cameras because they were funny.").
288. See, e.g., Brief for Student Press Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8,
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-278) ("In this case Frederick's speech occurred
on public property during a commercially sponsored community event that was open to the public.
The planning, creation and display of Frederick's message occurred entirely off of school property.
Frederick's speech was not part of a school class or extra-curricular project and he used no school
resources for its creation." (citations omitted)).
289. Lyle Denniston, Once Again No First Amendment Champion, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Oct. 1994,
at 70; but see Morse, 127 S. Ct at 2638-39 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("[T]o hold, as the Court does, that 'schools may take steps to safeguard those
entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use'
(and that 'schools' may 'restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal
drug use') is quite a different matter. This holding, based as it is on viewpoint restrictions, raises a host
of serious concerns." (internal citations omitted)).
290. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 537-38 (2001) (Breyer and O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
schoolhouse gates.
V. CONCLUSION
The No Child Left Behind Act expires this year. Once lauded as one
of President George W. Bush's greatest achievements, 291 it has since
been criticized (even by Republicans) as a failure. 292  Of course, the
NCLB Act may have failed for a number of reasons, including inadequate
funding-although America still spends more money per student than
virtually every other country in the world-and there is nothing that the
courts can do to change that. But what the struggles of the No Child
Left Behind Act demonstrate is that rigorous education reform is
meaningless if schools do not have the moral authority to control the
environment in which the reform
takes place. Courts can do something about that, and scrapping the
current student speech doctrine in favor of a more deferential in loco
parentis standard would go a long way toward restoring that moral
authority.
291. See William L. Taylor & Dianne M. Piche, Will New School Law Really Help?, USA TODAY, Jan.
9, 2002, at 13A (describing the No Child Left Behind Act as "a major step forward in providing
educational opportunities for poor children").
292. See Megan Boldt, GOP Urges State to Opt out of 'No Child', ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 7,
2007, at B3 (quoting a Republican state senator who called the law "a failure" and said "the state is
'held hostage' by what amounts to meager federal funds").
